ABSTRACT Lwamo et al. recently proposed a robust and efficient remote single and multi-server biometric authentication scheme using smart card and RSA. The scheme is vulnerable to the smart card lost attacks; therefore, the scheme cannot resist offline guessing attacks and user impersonation attacks, and cannot provide forward security and user anonymity. To address these issues, we propose a new privacy-preserving ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based remote biometric authentication scheme (RRBAS) for single and multi-server environments. RRBAS is the first lattice-based remote biometric authentication scheme for multi-server environments. Security analysis show that RRBAS can satisfy the authenticated key exchange (AKE) security in the random oracle model, resist known security attacks, and provide post-quantum security. The experimental evaluation and comparative analysis show that RRBAS's computational efficiency is better than that of Lwamo et al., while the communication efficiency is slightly lower than traditional schemes because of the large-size ciphertext of the lattice-based cryptosystem, but it is fully capable of session key agreement in single and multi-server environments.
Subsequently, some improved schemes and similar singleserver environments RAS have been proposed [27] , [42] , [47] , [48] . Such schemes require users to register for each application server one by one and they may need to set different passwords to achieve security and eliminate linkability between registration data. However, it is costly to record and use these passwords when the number of servers is large and storing the same user's information on each server is inefficient and uneconomic. To overcome these drawbacks, the multi-server environment RAS have been proposed in the literature [1] , [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] , [43] , [46] . Users only need to register once in a trusted registration center (RC) to authenticate and negotiate the session key with the third-party remote server registered in the same registry. In recent years, to meet new application requirements and their corresponding security objectives, RAS has been improved from being a single password authentication scheme into a multi-factor combination authentication scheme, such as password, smart cards, and biometrics. Security assumptions have been improved from hash functions, large integer factoring problems, discrete logarithm problems (DLP) in finite fields to DLP over elliptic curve (ECDLP) [29] [30] [31] [32] , and even post-quantum security assumptions such as lattice hard problems [33] [34] [35] . The cryptography also uses a public key encryption that is adapted to privacy.
Although many of the existing remote authentication schemes have achieved good security and usability, there are several issues to be addressed.
1) Vulnerable to hardware loss attack. The easy loss of hardware authentication factors is the weakness of hardware-based schemes, such as smart cards. With the development of side-channel attack technology, some hardware-based schemes are vulnerable to hardware loss attacks [24] . Lwamo et al. [1] , Li et al. [18] and Challa et al. [20] even lost its anonymity and forward security. 2) Vulnerable to offline guessing attack. Some smart card-based schemes use smart card local authentication methods on the user side; therefore, the smart card must store the secrets necessary for authentication [1] , [10] , [11] . Once the smart card is lost, there is a possibility that the scheme will be destroyed by an offline password attack [2] , [3] . It is also possible for an adversary to launch a centre search attacks against biometric security [8] , [9] . 3) Vulnerable to user impersonation attack. As mentioned above, the user side of most smart card-based schemes adopts smart card local authentication. The RC is only responsible for issuing certificates and assisting authentication, but not storing user information; therefore, the schemes are vulnerable to user impersonation attacks caused by offline guessing attacks [1] , [11] , [16] , [17] . Even some schemes use an offline RC and the key agreement process is related only to the secrets on the smart card, it is still possible for the adversary to bypass the local authentication and directly launch the user impersonation attacks [1] . 4) Vulnerable to user quantum attack. The development of quantum computing technology poses a huge security threat to RAS based on classical number theoretical hard problems. The existing RAS for multi-server environments are based on classical number theory problems, while existing postquantum RAS are only suitable for single-server environments [6] , [56] [57] [58] , [60] . As mentioned above, some hardware-based RAS are vulnerable to hardware loss attacks. Local authentication and even offline RC mode, while reducing communication overhead and improving protocol efficiency, may lead to offline guessing attacks and biometric security attacks, which may result in user impersonation attacks. Finally, traditional RAS cannot resist quantum attacks.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
To overcome the above challenges, this work proposes a privacy-preserving post-quantum security remote authentication scheme for single and multi-server environments. Following the security proof, performance analysis, and implementation evaluation, the proposed scheme makes up for all the shortcomings of Lwamo2019 and other discussed schemes. We summarized our main contributions as follows:
Our scheme can provide authenticated key exchange (AKE) security in the random oracle model (ROM ) and resist known security attacks. Both computational and communication overheads are achieved at a practical level. The computational overhead is even lower than that of the state-of-the-art works.
• We analyze the typical protocols such as Lwamo2019 and find that these anonymous remote authentication protocols for multi-server environments are unable to achieve their claimed multi-factor security. And Lwamo2019 is vulnerable to offline password guessing attacks and user impersonation attacks, and has forward security risks.
• We propose a privacy-preserving ring learning with errors (RLWE)-based remote biometric authentication scheme for single and multi-server environments (RRBAS), which is a distributed remote authentication system using hash functions to mask user IDs and passwords, protects the biometric information using fuzzy extractor [10] , [23] , and uses an efficient RLWE-based public key encryption scheme to achieve the security of this information during transmission.
• We give the formal proof and an informal security analysis of the proposed scheme. The results show that it can satisfy AKE security in the ROM and resist the known traditional and quantum attacks.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme through experimental implementation and comparative analyses. The results show that the computational and communication overheads of the proposed scheme are practical and the computational overhead is even lower than that of the state-of-the-art works.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly discuss the related work. Basic notations, RLWE security assumptions, NewHope public key encryption scheme and system model definition will be described in Section 3. The Lwamo2019 is reviewed and its weaknesses are analyzed in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We describe the details of our privacy-preserving remote authentication scheme in Section 6. The security analysis and performance evaluation will be given in Sections 7 and 8, respectively. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 9.
II. RELATED WORK
This section introduces the related research work for single and multi-server remote authentication schemes from the perspective of the two security assumptions of classical security and post-quantum security.
A. CLASSICAL-HARD-PROBLEM-BASED RAS
Most of the existing RAS are constructed on classical hard problems. In 1981, Lamport proposed the seminal work, Lamport1981 based on the hash function [25] . Later, many password-based RAS were proposed [27] , [28] . But they are vulnerable to the offline guessing attacks due to the weak password [36] . To overcome this security weakness, password and smart card-based two-factor RAS were proposed [37] [38] [39] . The security of the password-based RAS is significantly enhanced by the addition of smart cards. Such schemes are also widely used in campus and enterprise networks, and even e-banks because of their low cost and high usability. However, researcher quickly found that password and smart card-based RAS are still vulnerable to offline guessing attacks when the smart card is lost [2] , [40] , [41] .
To overcome the problem of RAS security degradation caused by smart card loss, a third authentication factor is naturally introduced, such as biometrics or other out-of-band information (e.g., short message services [SMS] or email). However, for real-time and security considerations, it is not recommended to use SMS as the third authentication factor in RAS [45] .
Pointcheval and Zimmer (2008) proposed the first provably secure three-factor AKE scheme [47] . They introduced a security model for multi-factor authenticated key exchange that combines a password, a secure device, and biometric authentications based on the ElGamal cryptosystem [50] . Since the ElGamal encryption scheme is bit-wise, the scheme is expensive and inefficient. Fan and Lin (2009) proposed another provably secure three-factor AKE scheme based on public-key encryption scheme [48] . In the login and authentication phase, the scheme also uses a symmetric encryption algorithm to ensure confidentiality. Combined with the advantages of public key and symmetric encryption tools, its computational efficiency is improved compared to Pointcheval-Zimmer's scheme. Yang and Yang (2010) proposed a three-factor AKE scheme based on the DLP [49] , which is the first multi-factor AKE scheme for multi-server environments, but it is less efficient because it requires multiple exponential operations. Five months later, Yoon and Yoo proposed another multi-factor AKE scheme for multi-server environments based on ECDLP [43] . However, He et al. proved that Yoon-Yoo's scheme was vulnerable to the privileged insider attack, the masquerade attack and the smart cart lost attack [52] , and an improvement was designed by He and Wang [51] . Chuang and Chen simultaneously revealed that Yoon-Yoo's scheme still had anonymity problems and proposed a lightweight anonymous multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme based on trust computing using nonce and hash functions [46] . In 2015, Odelu et al. [10] showed that He-Wang's scheme had weak anonymity and could not resist replay attack and user impersonation attack, while Lin et al. [53] showed that Chuang-Chen's scheme could not provide the claimed anonymity and could not resist user impersonation attacks, and server spoofing attacks. Kumari and Om (2017) showed that Chuang-Chen's scheme could not resist intermediate data attacks, user impersonation attacks and lacks forward security [54] . Kumari and Om claimed that their improved scheme can provide nonrepudiation as the authentication message sent by a user is signed by the server using the RSA digital signature; therefore, it can be resistant to all of the above attacks. Lwamo et al. (2018) found that Kumari-Om's scheme used too many exponential operations, resulting in excessive computational overhead. They proposed a new symmetric encryption and public key encryption-based remote authentication scheme for the single and multi-server environments to achieve lower computational overhead and higher security [1] . However, in this work, we show that Lwamo et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to smart card loss attack, and as a result, their scheme cannot resist the offline guessing attacks, user impersonation attacks, and lacks user anonymity. In addition, we show that their scheme cannot provide forward security.
B. LWE-BASED RAS
Post-quantum security is a new type of cryptographic primitive. RAS research based on post-quantum security assumptions focuses on lattice-based RAS, in particular, learning with errors (LWE)-based RAS. LWE's post-quantum security is due to the error component in its structure; therefore, the key agreement protocol implemented with LWE can only obtain approximately equal values instead of expecting the same value. There are currently two main ideas for solving this challenge academically: the error reconciliation mechanism where the key technology is the error reconciliation method [55] , and the public key encryption mechanism where its key technology is the ciphertext compression method. Ding et al. (2012) invented an error reconciliation mechanism in which both parties can reconcile the same bits based on signal bits [56] . However, the common bits reconciled by this method can not obey the uniform distribution and a VOLUME 7, 2019 random extraction operation is required to obtain a random value. Peikert (2014) proposed an improved error reconciliation mechanism so that both parties can directly obtain uniformly distributed common bits [57] . Bos et al. (2015) demonstrated the practicality of post-quantum key agreement by constructing ciphersuites for the transport layer security protocol, which provides an AKE based on Peikert's reconciliation mechanism. Compared with the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH ) scheme, this method has a higher communication overhead, but the computational complexity is quite close. Subsequently, Alkim et al. extended Peikert's reconciliation mechanism to latticeD 4 decoding and proposed a new RLWE-based point-to-point key exchange protocol, i.e., NewHope [6] . Compared with Bos et al.'s scheme, this method has a less than 50% communication overhead, but is more computationally efficient than ECDH scheme. In 2017, Xu et al. proposed the first password-based threeparty AKE protocol over RLWE [59] . Our study found that the scheme could not provide anonymity and caused all-forthe-price-of-one attacks due to the public parameter a [6] .
Bos et al. (2018) introduced a chosen plaintext attack (CPA)-secure public key encryption scheme based on Module-LWE, and designed a chosen ciphertext attack (CCA)-secure key agreement scheme based on this, i.e., Kyber [60] . Compared with NewHope, these schemes have similar performances, but Kyber has smaller communication overhead.
The schemes discussed above are single factor key agreement protocol, where [6] , [56] [57] [58] require the cooperation of other signature protocol to achieve mutual authentication of entities. Only [59] is suitable for multi-server environments. In this work we propose the first RLWE-based threefactor remote biometric authentication scheme for single and multi-server environments.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the preliminaries which is necessary to understand the rest of this work.
A. NOTATIONS
In this work, we use the symbol F q to represent the finite field with q elements. The polynomial ring R = Z/ x d + 1 , d is a power of 2. We write elements of R in lowercase, e.g., r ∈ R. The notation r [i] refers to the i-th coefficients of r. For r ∈ R, we use the notation [r] q to refer to rmodq , with coefficients reduced into the range (−q/2, q/2]. We write the dot product
represents that the function is run by the input specification. Other symbols used in this work and their descriptions are shown in Table 1 .
B. RLWE
Learning with error over ring ( RLWE ) is a famous variant of the Learning with error (LWE) problem, which replaces the inner product in LWE with a polynomial product. Lyubashevsky et al. introduced this problem in [4] and gave the quantum reduction of the worst-case approximate shortest vector problem SVP γ over ring to the search RLWE in [5] .
Lemma 1 (RLWE security assumptions): For security parameter λ, let f (x) = x d + 1 , let q ≥ 2 be an integer. Let R = Z/f (x) and R q = R/qR . Let χ be a distribution over R, a, s ∈ R q and e ∈ χ, construct distribution A s,e = (a, a, s + e) . Then, it is difficult to find s from any number of independent instances of the distribution A s,e , i.e., search RLWE (SRLWE) problem. It is also difficult to distinguish between an instance of the distribution A s,e and a uniform distribution over the distribution R 2 q with a non-negligible probability (1 − negl (λ)), i.e., decision RLWE (DRLWE) problem, where negl (λ) is a negligible probability function.
C. NEWHOPE-CPA-PKE
Alkim et al. proposed a semantic secure public key encryption (PKE) scheme with respect to adaptive chosen plaintext attacks based on the work [6] , i.e., NewHope-CPA-PKE. The PKE can be used to construct a RLWE-based key exchange protocol with CPA semantic security. In this section, we briefly introduce its three main algorithms: key generation algorithm NPKE.Gen (·), encryption algorithm NPKE.Enc (·) and decryption algorithm NPKE.Dec (·) [7] .
• NPKE.Gen (): First, Alice selects a 256-bit random seed seed, generates a ∈ R q with GenA (seed), and generates s, e ∈ R q with Sample (seed, nonce). See Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 4 of literature [7] for details. Second, computes b = a, s + e. Finally, returns pk = (b, seed), sk = s.
• NPKE.Enc (µ, pk): First, Bob encodes message µ ∈ {0, 1} 256 into µ ∈ R q with Encode (µ), generates a ∈ R q with GenA (seed), and generates s , e , e ∈ ψ n 8 with Sample (seed, nonce). See Algorithm 10, Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 4 of literature [7] for details. Second, computes u = a, s +e and v = b, s +e +µ . Finally, returns c = (u, v).
• NPKE.Dec (c, sk): Alice computes µ = v − u, s and returns µ = Decode µ , where, Decode (·) is the message decoding algorithm. See Algorithm 11 of literature [7] for details.
Theorem 1 (IND-CPA security of NewHope-CPA-PKE):
Let n and q be integers. Let χ be a probability distribution on R q . For any quantum algorithm A against the indistinguishability under CPA (IND-CPA) security of NewHope-CPA-PKE, there exists quantum algorithms B 1 and B 2 against the DRLWE problem such that
Moreover, the running times of B 2 and B 1 are the same as that of A, see the Theorem 4.4 of [7] for details.
D. SYSTEM MODEL 1) COMMUNICATION MODEL
The network of a remote authentication scheme for the single and multi-server environments is depicted in Figure 1 . It consists of three entities: Internet user U i , application server AS j and registration center RC. In the single server environments, the application server and the registration server are combined into one.
RC is a trusted or semi-honest third-party server whose role is to initialize the system and generate system parameters. U i and AS j could negotiate the session key without the preshared secret with the help of the RC.
AS j is a service provider server that provides users with specific Internet services and is one of the subjects of authentication. Application servers are typically deployed on private or public clouds, and their functionality and security are better than those of user devices.
U i is a user of various Internet services and is another subject of authentication. A variety of user entities are the main components of the Internet, but their resources and security are limited.
2) SECURITY GOALS
In addition to ensure the privacy of the private key of RC, the scheme should also meet the following security goals.
• Session key security: The main security goal of the scheme is to negotiate a secure session key between the U i and AS j with the help of the RC, and to ensure the privacy of the key to the RC.
• Mutual authentication: To ensure the security and effectiveness of the scheme, it must be mutual authentication between participating entities.
• Multi-factor security: When the adversary only gets any two of the three factors, the system is safe and does not increase the advantage of obtaining the third one.
• Forward security: The scheme has forward security, meaning that even if the adversary obtains all the longterm secret factors of all protocol entities, and it can't improve the advantage of destroying the security of the previously established session key.
• Privacy security: Biometric-based RAS privacy security includes two aspects: anonymity [2] and biometric security [8] . Anonymity has two meanings, which are the user's identity privacy and untrackability. User identity privacy is user ID protection, and user untrackability is the unlinkable of user sessions. Biometric security also includes two aspects, which are the security of fresh biometric samples and the security of the biometric templates stored on the other devices. The security of a fresh biometric sample is whether the sample is protected from leakage when the scheme encounters a social engineering attack or a brute force attack. The biometric template security is whether the template can be prevented from leaking when the protocol encounters a brute force attack or other template recovery attack. A valid template recovery attack is a centre search attack [9] .
• Resilience to other known attacks: The scheme should resist known attacks on the Internet, such as intermediate data attacks, and privileged insider attacks and so on.
3) ADVERSARY MODEL
Let P is an AKE protocol, and P x i denotes the x-th session instance of the protocol participant P i = U i , AS j , RC . During the running of the protocol, multiple parallel sessions are allowed to execute. The security of P is modeled by hybrid games between a challenger C and a probability polynomial time (PPT) adversary A, C simulates the output of participant in accordance with the protocol, the event A winning the game is denoted as Succ. The ability of the A is simulated by the following oracle queries:
This oracle simulates a passive attack, and the output is the interaction information of U i and AS j during protocol is run.
• SendU 2RC (RC z , m): This oracle simulates an active attack by A impersonating an application-side entity to RC. Since mutual authentication between U i and AS j is implemented by means of RC, we have reason to suspect that the messages transmitted by U i and AS j before the mutual authentication are forged. A sends a message m to instance RC z directly, C returns the processing result of m to A in accordance with the protocol. In addition, Send (P x , Start) is used to initiate a session.
• SendRC2AS AS y j , m : This oracle simulates an active attack by A impersonating to AS. A sends a message m VOLUME 7, 2019 to instance AS y j , C returns the processing result of m to A in accordance with the protocol.
• SendAS2U U x i , m : This oracle simulates an active attack by A impersonating to U i . A sends a message m to instance AS y j , C returns the processing result of m to A in accordance with the protocol.
• Reveal U x i , AS y j : This oracle simulates the known session key attack. On receiving this query, returns the established session key.
• Corrupt U x i , PW i : This oracle simulates that the user is partially corrupted and output the PW i of U i .
• Corrupt U x i , Bio i : This oracle simulates that the user is partially corrupted and output the Bio i of U i .
• Corrupt U x i , SC i : This oracle simulates that the user is partially corrupted and output the α i , δ i , γ i of SC i .
• Corrupt (P x ): This oracle is only used to describe forward security, that is, when A obtains all long-term secrets of all protocol entities, the session key that has been established are safe. The RC in this protocol may be honest and curious. We only assume that the private key of RC is leaked when evaluating the forward security of the session key.
• Test U x i , AS y j : This oracle does not simulate the attack ability of A, but is used to define the semantic security of the session key, which is only valid for fresh sessions (Definition 1). Returns ⊥ if the session key of instance has not been established, otherwise returns the session key only if A wins the coin flipping game, otherwise returns a random string of the same length as the session key. The privacy of the session key to RC the is also captured by this oracle.
Definition 1 (Freshness):
An instance P x is fresh if the following facts are true: 1) Instance P x accepts the protocol, runs and generates session key. 2) Reveal (·) has not been asked. 3) Corrupt (·) has not been asked until the protocol was terminated.
Definition 2 (Adversary advantage):
The advantage of an adversary A in destroying the AKE semantic security of the protocol P, is defined as
Definition 3 (AKE security):
A protocol P is said to be AKE secure if the adversary advantage Adv AKE P is negligible.
IV. REVIEW OF THE Lwamo2019
In order to facilitate the understanding of the subsequent cryptanalysis of Lwamo2019, in this section we briefly review the registration and authentication process of it [1] .
A. SERVER REGISTRATION
The application server sends identity SID j and its public key pub j to RC through a secure channel. The RC then replies to the server with a secure key PSK and a secret value x through a secure channel [1] .
B. USER REGISTRATION
The user selects a random number r i , computes MPW i = h (UID i r i PW i ) and REG (·) = (MPW i ⊕ Bio i ), and sends tuple {UID i , REG (·)} to RC. The RC then computes
, and stores them into the smart card SC i . Finally, the user writes r i into smart card,
C. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PROCESS
The login and authentication process of Lwamo2019 is shown in Figure 2 .
V. WEAKNESSES OF Lwamo2019
In this section, we show that Lwamo2019 is vulnerable to smart card lost attack and thus cannot resist offline password guessing attack and user impersonation attack, and has other security flaw [1] .
A. OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
Lwamo2019 adopts the offline authentication mode, and user device initiates a key agreement request after the smart card authenticating the user with
The offline mode and local authentication decisions that lack RC security protection are convenient for offline password guessing attacks. Under the non-tamper-resistance assumption about the smart card [2] and the three-factor security assumption [1] , after the adversary gets the smart card and biometric, the offline password guessing attack could be implemented. Details are as follows:
Step 1 The adversary uses the side channel attack technique to get the secrets {MUID i , r i , B i , C i , D i , h (·)} on the smart card.
Step 2 The adversary guesses UID * i , PW * i from the user identity space D UID and the password space D PW .
Step 3 The adversary computes
Step 4 If B * i = B i is true, the adversary wins the attack game, otherwise goes back to Step 2.
The time complexity of the above attack is O((2T h + 2T XOR ) · |D UID | · |D PW |). Where T h is the hash operation cost and T XOR is the XOR operation cost. Typically, user's UID and PW are low entropy strings for ease of memory and use. Therefore, the actual advantage of the adversary is even higher [3] .
B. USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
The lack of multi-factor security is likely to lead to user impersonation attack, but there is another possibility of user impersonation attack in Lwamo2019. As analyzed in the previous section, Lwamo2019 uses RC offline local authentication method. Once the smart card computes and determines that B * i = B i is true, a key negotiation request could be initiated. However, the calculation of all messages in the subsequent process only requires the secrets on the smart card, without any of UID i , PW i and Bio i . This means that once the adversary gets the secrets {MUID i , r i , B i , C i , D i , h (·)} on the smart card, it could spoof successfully the server by selecting the random number R i and faking {M 2 , M 3 } to start a user impersonation attack, because it thinks that the local authentication is negligible. The adversary can easily fake the M 5 because the calculated x * * = h (R i T 3 ) could correctly decrypt the M 4 . Eventually it will have the same session key SK ij = h R i B i SID j R j as the server.
M 4 is like a big gift box. After decryption, it is all a surprise,
. As someone wishes, UID i and SID j appear hand in hand, and user anonymity is lost.
C. FORWARD SECURITY ATTACK
Forward security requires that the established session key be secure even if the long-term secrets of all protocol entities are compromised. In Lwamo2019, if the adversary obtains the server private key sk j and the secrets in the user's smart card, it could derive the session key associated with it based on the captured login and authentication information Step 1 The adversary uses the side channel attack technique to get the secrets {MUID i , r i , B i , C i , D i , h (·)} on the smart card.
Step 2 The adversary decrypts M 3 to get M 1 .
Step 4 The adversary decrypts M 4 to get R j , and computes
The adversary only gets UID i , secret x and server private key sk j can still destroy the forward security of Lwamo2019. Details are as follows:
Step 1 The adversary decrypts M 3 to get M 1 .
Step 2 The adversary computes
Step 3 The adversary decrypts M 4 to get R j , and computes
VI. RRBAS
In this section, we propose a new remote single and multi-server biometric authentication scheme using RLWE, i.e., RRBAS, which withstands the security pitfalls of Lwamo2019 and provides post-quantum security. RRBAS consists of three entities: user, application server, and registration center. The protocol consists of five phases: initialization phase, application registration phase, user registration phase, authentication and key agreement phase, and user's long-term secret update phase.
A. INITIALIZATION
In this phase, the registration center RC generates system parameters. First, it runs the key generation algorithm NPKE.Gen (·) to generate system key (pk, sk). Then, it selects fuzzy extractor algorithms Gen (·) /Rep (·) and secure hashing algorithms h (·). Finally, it keeps sk and announces other parameters.
B. APPLICATION SERVER REGISTRATION
In this phase, AS j needs to register with RC. As described in Figure 3, 4) RC sends the tuple SIK j to AS j by secure communication, then application server registration completes.
C. USER REGISTRATION
U i submits registration information to RC which responds with the smart card SC i . As described in Figure 4 , the details are as follows: 
D. AUTHENTICATION AND SESSION KEY AGREEMENT
In this phase, U i and AS j mutually authenticate each other's identity and create a session key to ensure subsequent communication security. As described in Figure 5 , the details are as follows: 
E. UPDATE OF USER'S LONG-TERM SECRET
After U i authenticates with the smart card, the password PW i can be updated. If the credential UIK i needs to be updated, the RC authentication must be passed. As described in Figure 6 , the details of the process are similar to the previous authentication process, and will not be repeated here.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme is provably secure under the security model defined in section 3. Moreover, some other security properties are discussed in the last subsection.
A. FORMAL PROOF
Theorem 2 (RRBAS is AKE Secure): Let P be our RRBAS protocol. If the NewHope-CPA-PKE satisfies the IND-CPA security, and the h (·) is random oracle. Let A be a PPT adversary against P, who makes at most q s Send-query and q h Hash-query, the maximum advantage of A winning the game is
where l, n and θ denote the bit length of hash function, user's biometric and password. Proof: Let Succ i be the event that A wins game G i . These games begin from the real attack scenario. We gradually change the simulation rules of each game. In the final game, A will have no other advantage.
Game G 0 : G 0 is the real attack scenario, according to the definition 2, we have
Game G 1 : G 1 models a passive attack by querying the Execute U x i , AS y j oracle. But A can hardly increase the advantage of winning the game. Since the session key ss is computed by K and H , it is difficult for A to extract these values from {I 1 , I 2 , I 3 , I 4 }. According to section 6, K = NPKE.Dec sk i , c ij and the temporary secrets s, e, s , e , e used to compute K are sampled for each connection, 
Game G 2 : We transfer G 1 to this game by adding the SendU 2RC (RC z , m) oracle to model an active attack. A sends a fake tuple I 2 by modifying the response of the Send (P x , Start) oracle gradually:
Case1: A replaces the h 1 and h 2 in I 2 with the result of the Hash-query. According to the birthday attack, we have
Case2: A continues to modify I 2 , replacing the CUID i , CV i , CSID j and CV j with elements randomly selected over R q . According to the IND-CPA security of NewHope-CPA-PKE, we have
Combining the Case1-Case2 of G 2 and comparing to G 1 , we have 
Game G 5 : We transfer G 4 to this game by adding the Corrupt U x i , PW i or Corrupt U x i , Bio i oracle to enhance attack ability of A. We assume that A has acquired the secrets in the smart card SC i , then there are three strategies to attack three-factor security, and he/she chooses the one with the highest probability.
Case1: A fakes the β i with the result of the Hash-query when the PW i has been compromised. According to the birthday attack, we have
Case2: A also fakes the β i by guessing result Bio * i when the PW i has been compromised, we have
Case3: A fakes the MPB i by guessing result PW * i when the Bio i has been compromised, we have
Combining the Case1-Case3 of G 5 and comparing to G 4 , we have
Game G 6 : This game is the final game, which is translated from G 5 . To compute the session key ss = h (H K ), in addition to H , A must know K . According to the IND-CPA security of NewHope-CPA-PKE, the advantage of A winning the game is negl (λ). Thus we have
Otherwise, G 6 is just as the real case and Pr [Succ 6 ] = 1/2. Combining the Game G 1 to Game G 6 , we have
Theorem 2 is proven.
B. OTHER DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we demonstrate how our scheme achieves mutual authentication, three-factor security, session key security, forward security, user privacy security and resists other known attacks.
1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
During the authentication and session key agreement phase of RRBAS, RC authenticates AS j with h 2 which contains the registration credentials MSID j , SIK j of AS j , authenticates U i with h 1 which contains the registration credentials
AS j authenticates RC with h 3 which confirms that the private key sk owner of system public key pk holds the registration credentials MSID j , SIK j of it, indirectly authenticates U i by means of the RC authentication. U i authenticates RC with h 4 which confirms that the private key sk owner of system public key pk holds the registration credentials {MUID i , UIK i } of it, indirectly authenticates AS j by means of the RC authentication.
2) THREE-FACTOR SECURITY
As shown in the Game G 5 of the security proof, the advantage of A destroys AKE security is max q 2 h /2 l+1 , q s /2 n , q s /2 θ by attacking three-factor authentication security. Therefore, RRBAS has three-factor security.
3) SESSION KEY SECURITY
During the authentication and session key agreement phase of RRBAS, U i and AS j independently calculate the session key ss = h (H K ). According to the hash function one-way security and the IND-CPA security of the NewHope-IND-PKE, the advantage of A obtaining H and K is negligible. Therefore, RRBAS has session key security.
4) FORWARD SECURITY
During the authentication and session key agreement phase of RRBAS, the session key ss = h (H K ) is calculated independently by U i and AS j . K = NPKE.Dec sk i , c ij and the temporary secrets s, e, s , e , e used to compute it are sampled for each connection, H = h(UIK i SIK j v s sk) and the temporary secrets v i , v j , v s used to compute it are sampled for each connection. Therefore, even if A obtains the longterm secret of all the protocol entities, it cannot improve his advantage of destroying the security of the established session key.
5) PRIVACY SECURITY
Biometric-based AKE privacy security includes anonymity [2] and biometric security [8] .
During the authentication and session key agreement phase of RRBAS, UID i and SID j are hidden in NewHope-IND-PKE ciphertexts CUID i and CSID j . According to the IND-CPA security, the advantage of A obtaining the UID i and SID j is negligible, distinguishing different session key negotiation information from the same user is also negligible. Therefore, the UID i is neither leaked nor tracked, so RRBAS has user anonymity.
Biometric security includes the fresh biometric samples security and the biometric templates security. In the authentication and session key agreement phase of RRBAS, fresh biometric samples and biometric templates are protected by fuzzy extractor and secure hash. According to the security assumption of fuzzy extractor [23] , the advantage of A obtaining Bio i and Bio i is negligible. Therefore, regardless of the social engineering attacks, the advantage of A against the fresh biometric samples attack is equivalent to brute force attacks. The system architecture of RRBAS does not meet the conditions of the centre search attack [9] . Therefore, RRBAS has biometric security. 
7) RESISTANCE TO PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK
In the registration and authentication phase of the RRBAS, PW i and Bio i of U i are protected by fuzzy extractor and secure hash, and encapsulated in the form of MPB i = h(PW i β i ). Moreover, only the hash value of UID i and the random number are stored in the user registry T U . Therefore, even if A completely corrupts the RC, the security of the password and biometrics cannot be threatened.
8) RESISTANCE TO USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
As shown in the security proof in section 6, RRBAS has threefactor security, so that it can resist the user impersonation attack.
9) RESISTANCE TO INTERMEDIATE DATA ATTACKS
In the network of RRBAS, the communication link between AS j and RC is relatively secure. The intermediate data attack mainly occurs on the open link between AS j and U i . RRBAS has good anonymity, A can't get UID i and SID j , and can't track the session, so the replay attack against RRBAS is difficult to work. In addition, only hash values and NewHope-IND-PKE ciphertexts are forwarded between protocol entities, and the secrets that generats these values are freshly selected for each session, so the man-in-the-middle attack against RRBAS is also difficult to work.
10) RESISTANCE TO PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
According to the three-factor security of RRBAS, if the secrets of smart card SC i has been learned by the adversary A, and Bio i is compromised, the advantage of A destroying the AKE security by the offline password guessing attack is q s /2 θ , otherwise, its maximum probability is q s /2 θ +l . And because RRBAS is an online authentication method, it can effectively resist online dictionary attacks with the intrusion prevention strategy of RC. Therefore, RRBAS can resist the password guessing attack.
11) RESISTANCE TO KNOWN QUANTUM ATTACKS
RRBAS is designed based on the NewHope-CPA-PKE. According to Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, the advantage of any known quantum algorithm adversary to destroy the AKE security of RRBAS is equivalent to the advantage of against the DRLWE problem, which is negligible.
VIII. EVALUATION
This section demonstrates that RRBAS how to satisfy the security goals and application requirements from the security properties, computational complexity and communication overhead. 
A. COMPARISON OF SECURITY PROPERTIES
We evaluated the security properties of our improved scheme and compared it with eight recently proposed schemes in the literature, e.g., Odelu et al. [10] , Feng et al. [11] , Lwamo et al. [1] , Xu et al. [16] , Ying and Nayak [17] , Li et al. [18] , Qi et al. [19] , and Challa et al. [20] . The details are shown in Table 2 .
The results show that Feng et al. [11] , Lwamo et al. [1] , Xu et al. [16] , Ying-Nayak [17] , Li et al. [18] , Qi et al. [19] and Challa et al. [20] are vulnerable to hardware loss attack. In turn, offline password guessing attacks and biometric security attacks are caused, which leads to user impersonation attack and even loss of anonymity and forward security.
B. COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
To evaluate the computational complexity of RRBAS, we implemented all the basic operations of the scheme on the personal computer (Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-M380@2.53GHz processor, 6 GB RAM and with Ubuntu 16.04 operating system). We used gcc 5.4.0 to compile and run the RRBAS related operations based on the Newhope library [21] , and other discussed scheme related operations based on PBC library [22] , as shown in Table 3 .
We assume that the computational complexity of the fuzzy extractor, Biohash and elliptic curve scalar point multiplication are close. As shown in Table 4 , we use the results shown in Table 3 to estimate the computational cost of the protocol entities in the RRBAS authentication and key exchange phase. Regardless of the overhead of XOR operation, and the runtime of RRBAS is the lowest of the five online authentication schemes [10] , [11] , [18] [19] [20] even lower than the three offline schemes [1] , [16] , [17] .
C. COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
To estimate the communication overhead of the proposed scheme authentication and key exchange phase, we calculated the bit length of all data structures transmitted in RRBAS, as shown in Table 5 . Due to the special algebraic structure, the ciphertext size of the lattice-based scheme is generally larger than that of the traditional scheme, so no comparison is made here.
We use the results shown in Table 5 to analyze the communication overhead of RRBAS's authentication and key exchange phase, the details are shown in Table 6 . Regardless of the overhead of the underlying communication protocol, the overhead of the user side of the RRBAS is 7328 bytes, which can meet the practical requirements.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this work, we reviewed the recently proposed Lwamo2019 scheme and showed that the scheme is vulnerable to the smart card lost attack; therefore, the scheme fails to prevent the offline guessing attack and user impersonation attack, and cannot provide forward security and user anonymity. In addition, Lwamo2019 also cannot resist known quantum attacks. To withstand these drawbacks, we have proposed a secure and efficient remote single and multi-server biometric authentication scheme using RLWE, which is the first latticebased remote biometric authentication scheme for the multiserver environments. We proved the AKE security of the proposed scheme in the ROM and demonstrated that it can resist known security attacks through an informal security analysis. Moreover, we implemented the proposed scheme using C language based on the NewHope library. The results show that the computational cost of our scheme is less than Lwamo2019 and other discussed schemes, and the communication overhead is slightly higher than other schemes because the ciphertext of the lattice-based cryptosystem is inherently a big chunk, and the total communication overhead is only 14 KB, which meets the scenario requirements of no preshared information between users and servers but requires authentication key agreement.
